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The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
The eighth amendment to the Constitution prohibits excessive fines 
as well as excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishments.1 The 
Supreme Court has construed the eighth amendment generally as a 
check on the criminal justice system, which bears primary responsibil-
ity for imposing state-sponsored punishment.2 However, the criminal 
system is not the sole means through which the law punishes miscon-
duct; the civil system also uses penal sanctions. Civil courts and juries 
can punish a defendant's misconduct by awarding the plaintiff punitive 
or exemplary damages. 3 Such awards can reach millions4 and even 
billions of dollars. 5 Because of the punitive purpose of these awards, 
they resemble fines assessed for criminal misconduct. This resem-
blance raises the question of whether the excessive fines clause controls 
excessive punitive damage awards assessed in the civil system. 6 
Courts have been unwilling to apply the excessive fines clause to 
punitive damage awards that are arguably excessive. This reluctance 
results from the view that many constitutional safeguards, including 
1. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
2. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). 
3. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176-77 (1931). 
Civil penalties are sanctions related to punitive damages but they arise where the government is 
the plaintiff. While such penalties should undergo similar analysis, they generally are statutorily 
set at levels far below punitive damages and therefore do not violate the excessive fines clause. 
They are also assessed for reasons other than punishment. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 
U.S. 242, 246, 250 (1980). 
This Note relies on numerous civil penalty cases. Courts that treat civil penalties as civil 
sanctions that fall outside the scope of the eighth amendment would presumably do likewise for 
punitive damages. 
4. E.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (jury 
awarded $125 million punitive damages). 
5. See, e.g., Texaco Must Pay $11 Billion Award, Texas Court Rules, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 
1985, at 1, col. 1 ($3 billion in punitive damages). 
6. The Supreme Court has not answered this question, but may do so soon. See Bankers Life 
& Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1985) (defendant argues that $1.6 million 
punitive damage award on a compensatory award of $20,000 violates the excessive fines clause), 
prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 1367 (1987), summarized in 55 U.S.L.W. 3600 (Mar. 10, 1987). 
This question has also been raised in Jeffries, A Comment an the Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139 (1986). Professor Jeffries has "open[ed] the debate," id. at 158, as 
to whether repetitive punitive damage awards may violate either the eighth amendment or more 
general due process requirements. He argues that punitive damages are "functionally equivalent 
to the 'fines' addressed by the eighth amendment and should be subject to constitutional scrutiny 
on that basis." Id. at 151. This Note goes beyond Jeffries to look at the difficulties courts have 
encountered in addressing the excessive fines clause argument and further to suggest means by 
which courts should analyze the argument. It suggests that the relevant inquiry is not whether 
punitive damages are a criminal or quasi-criminal sanction but whether they are sufficiently pe-
nal to require eighth amendment scrutiny. 
1699 
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the protections of the eighth amendment, are limited to the criminal 
setting and are inappropriate in a civil lawsuit between private parties. 
Most of these protections are textually linked to criminal proceed-
ings.7 Others, while not textually linked, are also closely associated 
with criminal investigations and prosecutions. 8 In cases involving the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause, the Supreme Court has closely 
associated the entire eighth amendment with criminal punishment, 
particularly capital punishment.9 As a result, the excessive fines 
clause has generally been assumed to apply only in criminal cases. 10 
But a fine that is constitutionally excessive in a criminal setting is no 
less excessive in a civil setting. From the defendant's perspective, 
monetary penalties assessed in a criminal prosecution are functionally 
identical to punitive damages awarded in a civil lawsuit - in either 
case he owes money as punishment for his wrongdoing. 
Of the few lower courts facing the excessive fines clause argument, 
most have addressed the issue on a more superficial level by relying on 
the Supreme Court's decision in Ingraham v. Wright. 11 In that deci-
sion, the Court held that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of 
the eighth amendment is inapposite in a civil suit. 12 Most courts read 
Ingraham as controlling. However, this reliance is problematic. The 
excessive fines clause was not at issue in Ingraham but was merely 
implicated by association. Nonetheless, courts regularly rely on In-
graham in holding that all clauses of the eighth amendment apply only 
in the criminal context. 
Undeniable differences exist between criminal prosecutions and 
civil lawsuits;13 however, because of the escalating stakes involved, 
courts and commentators are reexamining whether the criminal/civil 
distinction is a satisfactory reason for denying a defendant certain pro-
tections to which he would be entitled if he were criminally prose-
cuted.14 Some courts have questioned, without deciding, whether 
7. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.") (emphasis 
added). 
8. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (unreasonable search and seizure). 
9. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The excessive bail clause also links the eighth amend-
ment with the criminal context. 
10. See, e.g., Dalton v. Bob Neill Pontiac, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 789, 797 n.13 (M.D.N.C. 1979), 
ajfd. mem., 628 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1980); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 217 (Colo. 
1984). 
11. 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (5-4 decision). 
12. 430 U.S. at 664; see Section II.A infra. 
13. See Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 408, 410-11 (1966) [hereinafter Comment, Criminal Safeguards]. 
14. Articles reciting some of the challenges include: Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and 
Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1976); Note, The 
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large punitive damage awards may violate the excessive fines clause of 
the eighth amendment. 15 The criminal/civil distinction is unsettling 
where it results in excessive monetary punishments that are immune 
from eighth amendment scrutiny merely because they arise in the set-
ting of a civil suit between private parties.16 
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 17 the Supreme Court re-
cently heard argument as to whether the excessive fines clause applies 
to punitive damages, but the Court did not have occasion to pass on 
the issue. 18 The case arose from a bad faith insurance claim in which 
Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1158 (1966); Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 
VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1984); Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the 
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 37 (1983). 
The most serious questions fall into four categories: First, whether punitive damages function 
as quasi-criminal sanctions and as such entitle the defendant to criminal procedural safeguards of 
the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. See Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for 
Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478 (1971); Grass, The Penal Dimen-
sions of Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 241 (1985); Wheeler, The Constitutional 
Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983). Second, whether 
multiple recoveries of punitive damages in mass tort litigation violate the "fundamental fairness" 
at the heart of due process. Compare In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 899-900 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983), with Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 
1571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986); see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 100 F.RD. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 
1003-05 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 182 (1986); Jeffries, supra note 6, at 151-53; Note, Mass 
Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797 (1979); Note, Punitive Damages 
in Mass Tort Litigation - Froud v. Celotex Corp., 32 DE PAULL. REv. 457 (1983); Ford, The 
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, in THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15, 20-22 
(Defense Research Institute Monograph 1969); 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES LAW AND PRACTICE§ 3.03, at 8-10 & nn.12-23.50 (1985 & Supp. 1986). Third, whether 
statutory standards for assessing punitive damages are void for vagueness. See id. at 10-11 & 
nn.25-30. Finally, whether punitive damages implicate equal protection rights, See In re Paris 
Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 705 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (state law denying claims for 
punitive damages in wrongful death actions violates equal protection clause), revd., 622 F.2d 
1315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 
1139 (2d Cir. 1986) (defendant argues bond provision for punitive damage award prevents an 
effective appeal), revd., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987), or violate first amendment freedoms, Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
15. E.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1589 (1986); Womack v. Gettelf-
inger, 808 F.2d 446, 451 (6th Cir. 1986); Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 922 n.10 
(8th Cir. 1986); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1004 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 
182 (1986). 
16. See Telephone News Sys. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill. 1963) 
(three-judge court), affd., 376 U.S. 782 (1964): 
[W]here the forfeiture of property will be fatal to the business life of the party involved and 
substantially greater and more severe than the maximum punishment which could have 
been imposed in a direct criminal proceeding, labeling it preventive and non-penal is a soph-
istry which hardly warrants the abrogation of the Constitutional protections which are the 
keystones of American criminal justice. 
220 F. Supp. at 643 (Will, J., concurring). See also In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 
1003-05 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 182 (1986). 
17. 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986). 
18. 106 S. Ct. at 1589. The Court held that one justice of the Alabama Supreme Court 
should have been disqualified from the case because he had filed two similar actions of his own. 
The Court vacated and remanded the decision. 
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the jury awarded the plaintiff $1,378 in actual damages and $3,500,000 
in punitive damages19 - a ratio that the defendant characterized as 
"the same as four hours bears to one year."20 The Alabama Supreme 
Court upheld the jury award in a five-to-four decision which the 
United States Supreme Court vacated.21 Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice Burger did not simply dismiss the excessive fines question but 
acknowledged that the defendant's argument "that a $3.5 million pu-
nitive damage award is impermissible under the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment ... raise[s] [an] important issueD 
which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved .... "22 
This Note explores whether courts should look beyond the broad 
language in Ingraham v. Wright and scrutinize punitive damages 
under the excessive fines clause. Part I sets out the intuitive argument 
that punitive damages are analogous to criminal fines. Part II ana-
lyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Ingraham v. Wright and also 
reviews the few federal and state court decisions that have dealt with 
the excessive fines clause in civil cases, most of which have concluded 
that the clause has no application in a civil setting. This Part asserts 
that courts cannot rely solely on the Ingraham decision but must ex-
amine the history of the excessive fines clause and the penal character 
of punitive damages. Part III pursues the analysis that is lacking in 
those decisions which have relied on Ingraham. First, this Part 
sketches the history of the eighth amendment to determine whether 
the excessive fines clause should apply only to criminal fines and not 
civil punitive damages or whether the clause expresses a broader prin-
ciple requiring proportionality in punishments of any form. Second, 
this Part questions whether punitive damages are sufficiently penal to 
implicate eighth amendment scrutiny. Part III suggests that courts 
apply the analysis outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 23 rather 
than Ingraham. Finally, Part IV concludes that, since the excessive 
fines clause is historically linked to civil monetary penalties and since 
punitive damages are penal in nature, excessive awards violate the 
eighth amendment's principle of proportionality in punishments. This 
Note contends that the eighth amendment, unlike other constitutional 
protections, functions as a restraint on the broader system of punish-
19. 106 S. Ct. at 1582. 
20. Brief for Appellant at 45, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986) (No. 84-
1601). 
21. 106 S. Ct. at 1589. 
22. 106 S. Ct. at 1589. On remand to the Alabama Supreme Court, two justices wrote spe· 
cially concurring opinions that took note of the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of the signifl· 
cance of the excessive fines clause argument. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 
1987). One justice predicted that the United States Supreme Court would soon review the issue, 
505 So. 2d at 1059 & n.1 (Maddox, J., concurring specially); the other explicitly accepted the 
argument that punitive damages could violate the eighth amendment, 505 So. 2d at 1060-61 
(Houston, J., concurring specially). 
23. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
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ment rather than simply the process through which criminals are pros-
ecuted. It argues that courts should determine whether punitive 
damages are sufficiently penal to warrant eighth amendment protec-
tion and not whether punitive damages are criminal or quasi-criminal 
sanctions. 
I. THE CRIMINAL FINE ANALOGY 
Punitive damages occupy a unique position in the civil courts. 
They are a criminal/civil hybrid: while arising only in civil cases, they 
mainly serve the criminal law goals of retribution and deterrence 
rather than the traditional compensatory goals of the civil law.24 Like 
criminal punishments, punitive damages are assessed with respect to 
the defendant's culpability and the egregiousness of his conduct. Puni-
tive damages serve as a surrogate for criminal sanctions by punishing 
misbehavior through the civil law that may go unpunished or un-
derpunished in the criminal law.25 As such, the law of punitive dam-
ages historically has not been concerned with awarding a windfall to 
the successful plaintiff but rather has looked to punishing the culpable 
defendant. Ultimately, it is the state and not the individual that is 
exacting the punishment. 26 
Courts and commentators analogize punitive damages to criminal 
fines. For instance, the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Jnc., 27 stated that "[punitive damages] are not compensation for in-
jury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish 
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."28 Other ju-
rists have recognized that punitive damages "serve the same function 
as criminal penalties and are in effect private fines,"29 "punitive 
'fine[s],' "30 and "fine[s] imposed for the vindication of the criminal 
law."31 Some commentators view punitive damages as virtual 
24. See generally Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in 
Products Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1 (1985-86); 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 
14, §§ 4.13-.16. The majority of jurisdictions cite punishment and deterrence as the purposes of 
punitive damages. See id. § 4.14. Some states see the purpose as deterrence alone, see id. § 4.15; 
one views it as punishment alone, see id. § 4.16. In a few states, punitive damages are intended 
only as compensation to injured parties for damages above the actual physical damages. See id. 
§ 4.13. 
25. 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 14, § 2.02, at 5. 
26. There have been suggestions that punitive damages should not be paid to the plaintiff at 
all but should go to the state. E.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). Statutes have also been proposed whereby punitive damage awards would go to state school 
systems, nonprofit organizations, or the state treasury. See 2 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra 
note 14, § 21.02, at 4, § 21.04, at 22, § 21.06, at 41; K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § l.l(C) 
(1980). 
27. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
28. 418 U.S. at 350. 
29. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
30. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
31. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 381 (1873). 
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equivalents of criminal fines. In their criminal law treatise, LaFave 
and Scott write, "Paying damages (especially 'punitive damages') for 
torts or contract breaches is not much different from paying fines for 
criminal violations."32 Prosser and Keeton recognize punitive dam-
ages as a "rather anomalous" invasion of criminal law into "the field 
of torts."33 Courts and commentators have attached the label "quasi-
criminal" to punitive damages, indicating that such damages contain 
elements of the criminal law.34 
There are undeniable differences between punitive damages and 
criminal fines. Punitive damages are paid to the private plaintiff; crim-
inal fines are paid to the state. 35 Imprisonment may accompany a 
criminal fine. A criminal conviction carries a greater stigma than a 
large civil judgment. 36 Such distinctions, however, seem of little con-
solation for the defendant subject to a large punitive damage award for 
misconduct that would be less harshly punished if he were subject to 
criminal prosecution only. 
A comparison between criminal fine cases and civil punitive dam-
age cases highlights the troublesome civil/criminal distinction. The 
criminal defendant in United States v. Busher, 37 convicted of federal 
racketeering, forfeited approximately $3 million to the United States 
for fraudulent conduct amounting to only $335,00038 - a ratio of less 
than ten to one. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant made a 
32. 1 w. LAFAVE & A. Scarr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW§ 1.3(a), at 16 {1986) (foot-
note omitted). 
33. W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS§ 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. See also K. RED-
DEN, supra note 26, § 2.4(A) ("Exemplary damages occupy an anomalous position among civil 
remedies because of their distinctive deterrent or punitive character."). 
34. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Huber 
v. Teuber, 10 D.C. (3 MacArth.) 484, 490 (1877)); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 
(1886); Womack v. Gettelfinger, 808 F.2d 446, 451 (6th Cir. 1986); Clark, supra note 14, at 414; 
Sales & Cole, supra note 14, at 1118. The term "quasi-criminal" traditionally characterizes pro-
ceedings bearing the nature of a criminal prosecution. Examples include proceedings for con-
tempt, disbarment, and failure to pay child support. 35A WORDS & PHRASES 450-52 {1963). 
35. The distinction between the parties - private persons versus state actors - raises the 
issue of whether the excessive fines clause should apply where the state is not directly involved as 
a litigant. Commentators examining the issue have concluded that the plaintiff's identity should 
not determine whether constitutional safeguards should apply. Wheeler, supra note 14, at 345-
49; Charney, supra note 14, at 505-06 & n.152; Jeffries, supra note 6, at 148 & n.37. The focus of 
the eighth amendment supports this conclusion: the amendment aims to protect the defendant 
from excessive punishment and not to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining a windfall. However, 
the punishment must at least be imposed under color of state law. See Oral Argument of Peti-
tioner at 2, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), reprinted in 93 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 314 (P. Kurland & G. Caspar 
eds. 1978) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]. The "color of state law" requirement is probably 
satisfied by the state's enactment and administration of statutes authorizing punitive awards. 
E.g .• CAL. C1v. CODE§ 3294{a) (Deering 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (Supp. 1986). 
36. Comment, Criminal Safeguards, supra note 13, at 410-11. 
37. 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987). 
38. 817 F.2d at 1414. 
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prima facie showing that the forfeiture may have been so dispropor-
tionate as to violate the excessive fines clause, and therefore remanded 
to the district court for a determination of the constitutionality of the 
fine. 39 In comparison, punitive damages may be assessed in ratios far 
greater than ten to one without invoking constitutional scrutiny under 
the excessive fines clause. For instance, punitive damages in bad faith 
insurance cases can reach millions of dollars where compensatory 
damages amount to only a few thousand dollars.40 In mass tort and 
products liability cases, such as the Dalkon Shield litigation, defen-
dants may be liable for multiple punitive damage awards arising out of 
the same misconduct.41 While each individual award may not be ex-
cessive, the aggregate could be. As a result, the defendant who has 
incurred punitive damages may be punished more harshly by the civil 
system than by the criminal system. 
Currently, juries assessing punitive damages are constrained only 
by ill-defined and inconsistently applied notions of excessiveness.42 
For instance, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 43 the Supreme Court 
commented that "jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited 
only by the gentle rule that [punitive damages] not be excessive. Con-
sequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable 
amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused."44 
Courts can admonish juries to avoid passion, prejudice, or other emo-
tions in fixing punitive awards45 and can remit awards that they con-
sider excessive.46 However, there is far less control over civil jury 
awards than over criminal punishments, thus the potential for exces-
sive awards is higher in civil cases. 47 
II. THE INFLUENCE OF INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT 
In spite of the acknowledged similarities between punitive damages 
and criminal fines, many ·courts have retreated from the analogy for 
purposes of the eighth amendment. For the few cases involving the 
39. 817 F.2d at 1415-16. 
40. E.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986) ($3.5 million to $1,378). See 
also Downey Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. 
Rptr. 835 (1987) ($5 million to $153,000), petition far cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3115 (U.S. July 22, 
1987) (No. 87-159). 
41. E.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 
887, 899-900 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied., 459 U.S. 1171 
(1983). 
42. See K. REDDEN, supra note 26, §§ 3.4-.5. 
43. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
44. 418 U.S. at 350. 
45. See generally 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 14, §§ 11.01-.20 (survey of model 
jury instructions). 
46. See 2 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 14, § 18.05, at 16-17. 
47. See generally K. REDDEN, supra note 26, § 3.6(A), at 62-63 (discussing criticism of the 
jury's power to award punitive damages). 
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excessive fines clause in the last decade, the Supreme Court's 1977 
decision in Ingraham v. Wright 48 has had controlling influence. The 
case, however, involved the cruel and unusual punishment clause and 
not the excessive fines clause. In deciding Ingraham and other cruel 
and unusual punishment cases, the Supreme Court has characterized 
the entire eighth amendment as intended for the criminal context 
only.49 The Court's language has subsumed the excessive fines clause 
into the cruel and unusual punishment clause. This characterization 
has led courts to hold that the excessive fines clause applies to criminal 
cases only.50 Such a broad reading of Ingraham is not warranted. 
A. The Supreme Court Decision 
The case arose out of the paddling of two children attending a 
Florida public school. Their parents sued, claiming in part that the 
disciplinary paddlings by the teachers violated the children's eighth 
amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.51 
The Court held in a five-to-four decision that the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause does not apply in civil cases involving the paddling 
of schoolchildren. 52 The majority recited the history of the eighth 
amendment, concluding: 
Bail, fines, and punishment traditionally have been associated with the 
criminal process, and by subjecting the three to parallel limitations the 
text of the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those 
entrusted with the criminal-law function of government. An examina-
tion of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this Court 
construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment con-
firms that it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes. 53 
To support this conclusion, Justice Powell examined the English 
curbs on torture and other cruel punishments and determined that the 
framers of the eighth amendment were principally concerned with lim-
48. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
49. 430 U.S. at 664; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 nn.16-17 (1979); Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 102-03 & n.7 (1976); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890). 
50. E.g., Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 
108-09 n.129 (D.S.C. 1979), ajfd. mem., 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981); Dalton v. Bob Neill Pon-
tiac, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 789, 797 n.13 (M.D.N.C. 1979), ajfd. mem., 628 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 
1980); Downey Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. 
Rptr. 835, 852 (1981),petitionfarcert.fi/ed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3115 (U.S. July 22, 1987) (No. 87-159); 
Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 217 (Colo. 1984); Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. 
Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 355-56, 629 P.2d 196, 206 (1981). 
51. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653-59. 
52. 430 U.S. at 664. 
53. 430 U.S. at 664. See also 430 U.S. at 665-66 ("[T]he principal concern of the American 
Framers appears to have been with the legislative definition of crimes and punishments. But if 
the [eighth amendment] was intended to restrain government more broadly than its English 
model, the subject to which it was intended to apply - the criminal process - was the same.") 
(citations omitted). 
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iting the extent of criminal punishments. 54 He found it "not surpris-
ing ... that every decision of this Court considering whether a 
punishment is 'cruel and unusual' ... has dealt with a criminal pun-
ishment."55 From this collective history he concluded that the cruel 
and unusual punishment clause does not apply outside the criminal 
context. Justice Powell also noted that eighth amendment concerns 
do not arise without an adjudication; where there has been no formal 
adjudication, the pertinent constitutional safeguard is the due process 
clause.56 
For Justice Powell, the setting of the punishment was controlling. 
He wrote, "In the few cases where the Court has had occasion to con-
front claims that impositions outside the criminal process constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no difficulty finding the 
Eighth Amendment inapplicable."57 Furthermore, he stated, "The 
prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, 
separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarcera-
tion. "58 Powell, however, did not make the criminal label absolutely 
mandatory for eighth amendment protections to apply. He did con-
cede that "[s]ome punishments, though not labeled 'criminal' by the 
State, may be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments . . . to 
justify application of the Eighth Amendment."59 However, he did not 
specify how a court is to determine whether a particular punishment is 
"sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments." 
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. 60 He criticized the majority's 
"vague and inconclusive recitation of the history of the Amend-
ment"61 and the Court's bootstrap argument which reasoned that be-
cause every prior case has involved criminal punishment the eighth 
amendment necessarily distinguishes criminal from noncriminal pun-
ishment. 62 He also highlighted the majority's acknowledgment that 
54. 430 U.S. at 664-66. 
55. 430 U.S. at 666. This reasoning is ironic since Justice Powell later uses the opposite 
reasoning to criticize the dissent. He argues that "the absence of reported Florida decisions 
hardly suggests that no remedy [for unreasonable corporal punishment] is available." 430 U.S. 
at 677 n.45. 
56. 430 U.S. at 671 n.40. 
57. 430 U.S. at 667-68. 
58. 430 U.S. at 669. 
59. 430 U.S. at 669 n.37. As an example, Justice Powell cites In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), 
which held that a juvenile subject to a delinquency hearing is entitled to certain criminal protec-
tions, even if the proceeding is not labeled "criminal." He later noted Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S 144 (1963), where the Court held that denationalization was a punishment; 
though not labeled criminal, which could only be imposed through the criminal process. 430 
U.S. at 671 n.40 (citing 372 U.S. at 162-67, 186). 
60. 430 U.S. at 683 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also filed a separate dissenting 
opinion that discussed the due process issue. 430 U.S. at 700-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
61. 430 U.S. at 685. 
62. 430 U.S. at 686. 
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the eighth amendment has never been confined to criminal punish-
ments so long as the punishment at issue is sufficiently analogous to 
criminal punishment. 63 
Justice White read the eighth amendment as requiring an examina-
tion of the punishment's purpose and not the label attached. 64 He 
stated, 
If there are some punishments that are so barbaric that they may not be 
imposed for the commission of crimes, designated by our social system 
as the most thoroughly reprehensible acts an individual can commit, 
then, a fortiori, similar punishments may not be imposed on persons for 
less culpable acts, such as breaches of school discipline. Thus, if it is 
constitutionally impermissible to cut off someone's ear for the commis-
sion of murder, it must be unconstitutional to cut off a child's ear for 
being late to class. 65 
The dissenting justices would rather adopt a "purposive approach'' 
that would tum on "whether the purpose of the deprivation is among 
those ordinarily associated with punishment, such as retribution, reha-
bilitation, or deterrence."66 They focus on the words of the amend-
ment itself, stating, "[T]he constitutional prohibition is against cruel 
and unusual punishments; nowhere is that prohibition limited or modi-
fied by the language of the Constitution."67 Justice White criticizes 
the majority for being misleading: "The Court would have us believe 
. . . that there is a recognized distinction between criminal and non-
criminal punishments for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. This is 
plainly wrong."68 Unlike the majority, the dissent does not take a 
strict historical view, but reads the words of the amendment in broad 
terms, addressing the scope of all punishments, irrespective of their 
contexts. 
The majority's opinion in Ingraham addresses the cruel and unu-
sual punishment issue in language that implicates the entire eighth 
amendment. 69 However, the Court did not confront the questions of 
whether the excessive fines clause requires the same conclusion after a 
similar analysis and what forms of punishment are "sufficiently analo-
63. 430 U.S. at 688 (noting the majority's statement, 430 U.S. at 669 n.37). See note 59 supra 
and accompanying text. 
64. 430 U.S. at 688 ("The relevant inquiry is not whether the offense for which a punishment 
is inflicted has been labeled as criminal"); 430 U.S. at 688 ("the majority adopts a rule that turns 
on the label given to the offense for which the punishment is inflicted"). 
65. 430 U.S. at 684 (footnote omitted). 
66. 430 U.S. at 686-87. 
67. 430 U.S. at 685 (emphasis in original). 
68. 430 U.S. at 686. 
69. Justice Blackmun at oral argument even assumed that the excessive fines clause applies 
only in the criminal context, stating, "Well now, there are three parts to the Eighth Amendment, 
aren't there? Excessive bail and fines, both of which are in the criminal context." Oral Argu-
ment of Petitioner at 7, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), reprinted in LANDMARK 
BRIEFS, supra note 35, at 319 (1978). 
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gous to criminal punishments" to invoke the eighth amendment's pro-
tections. In spite of the apparent differences between a cruel and 
unusual punishment argument in a child-spanking case and an exces-
sive fines clause argument in a punitive damages case, courts have read 
Ingraham broadly to foreclose the latter. In doing so, they have 
avoided an independent inquiry into the origins of the excessive fines 
clause and into the penal aspects of punitive damages. 
B. Excessive Fines Clause Cases and Reliance on 
Ingraham v. Wright 
Of those courts that have interpreted the excessive fines clause70 or 
the state equivalent71 in punitive damages cases, the majority have 
held or implied that the clause or the entire eighth amendment is inap-
plicable in civil cases. However, some courts, both federal and state, 
have either accepted the argument for applying the clause in civil cases 
or recognized its merit. 
A few cases decided prior to Ingraham v. Wright generally consid-
ered the excessive fines clause as categorically the same as the cruel 
and unusual punishment and excessive bail clauses and held that it did 
not apply in civil penalty cases.72 No meaningful authority or analysis 
supported these cases. For instance, in United States v. Stangland, 73 
the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of civil penalties as-
70. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated that the excessive fines clause 
applies to the states, such an inference would be reasonable based upon the Court's treatment of 
the other two clauses of the eighth amendment. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 
666·67 (1962); 370 U.S. at 675 (Douglas, J., concurring); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 
(1971) (citing Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1963)). Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has held that the other safeguards of the Bill of Rights apply to the states. See, e.g., 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1956); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 & n.2 (1964). 
71. In addition to the application of the excessive fines clause to the states through the four-
teenth amendment, most states have clauses in their constitutions identical to the eighth amend-
ment. States whose constitutions predate the Bill of Rights adopted the principles in the Virginia 
Bill of Rights. R. PERRY & J. COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 309 (1959); see, e.g., DEL. 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776), reprinted in R. PERRY & J. COOPER, supra, at 339; 
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI (1780), reprinted in R. PERRY & J. COOPER, supra, at 377. 
Later, other states modelled their constitutions on the federal Constitution. E.g., OHIO CONST. 
art. I, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. Cf FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("Excessive fines ... are 
forbidden"). 
72. See Robbins v. Police Pension Fund, 321 F. Supp. 93, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Zwick v. 
Freeman 373 F.2d 110, 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967); United States v. Stang-
land, 242 F.2d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1957); State ex rel Hardy v. State Bd. of Equalization, 319 P.2d 
1061, 1063-64 (Mont. 1958); Skinner v. State ex rel. Williamson, 115 P.2d 123, 125-26 (Okla. 
1941), revd. sub nom. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); In re Chester School District's 
Audit, 151 A. 801, 808 (Pa. 1930); cf In re Walsh, 315 N.Y.S.2d 59, 61 (1970) (eighth amend-
ment applies to criminal cases only). But see State ex rel. Hardy v. State Bd. of Equalization, 319 
P.2d 1061, 1066 (Mont. 1958) (Angstman, J., dissenting) ("It is a fallacious notion that [Mon-
tana's excessive fines provision] protects a criminal who has been convicted of a crime, but that 
the sky is the limit [for civil penalties]"). While the early cases involved civil penalties, the 
majority view that the eighth amendment is inapplicable would also apply to punitive damages 
cases. 
73. 242 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1957). 
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sessed against wheat farmers for violations of marketing quotas. The 
court held, without citation of any authority or analysis of any history, 
that in "suits to recover civil penalties . . . the Eighth Amendment 
argument is inapposite."74 Subsequent cases relied upon the terse 
holding in Stang/and to reach the same conclusion. For instance, the 
Second Circuit in Zwick v. Freeman 75 relied exclusively on Stang/and 
in ruling that the excessive fines clause does not apply to civil penal-
ties. 76 Other courts have subsequently cited Stang/and or Zwick for 
the same proposition.77 Therefore, this pre-Ingraham line of cases ul-
timately depended upon the Stang/and holding - a holding unsup-
ported by any case law or analysis. 
Some pre-Ingraham courts were not satisfied that the eighth 
amendment argument could be so easily dismissed. In Toepleman v. 
United States, 78 the appellants argued that multiple civil forfeitures 
assessed by the government were unconstitutionally excessive. 
Although the Fourth Circuit found no constitutional abuses, it rea-
soned that the eighth amendment limits the excessiveness of civil pun-
ishments. 79 Before Ingraham, some state courts also either recognized 
or implied that the excessive fines clause applies to civil sanctions, in-
cluding punitive damages. 80 
74. 242 F.2d at 848. 
75. 373 F.2d 110 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967). 
76. 373 F.2d at 119. 
77. E.g., Dalton v. Bob Neill Pontiac, Inc. 476 F. Supp. 789, 797 n.13 (M.D.N.C. 1979), ajfd. 
mem., 628 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1980); Downey Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 189 
Cal. App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr. 835, 852 (1987),petitionfarcert.fi/ed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3115 (U.S. 
July 22, 1987) (No. 87-159). 
78. 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989 (1959). 
79. [W]hile the Eighth Amendment has generally been thought to apply only to criminal 
cases ... there would seem to be no basis in reason why a court could not invoke the Eighth 
Amendment, either specifically or by analogy, to prevent an abuse of the power of punish-
ment though it be only manifested in a civil form. 
263 F.2d at 700 (citations omitted). 
80. E.g., Keller v. Keller, 323 P.2d 231, 235 (Wash. 1958) ("In a civil proceeding, ••• 
[c]onstitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines provide 
the extreme limits of the court's discretionary powers."). 
Although Florida courts have never scrutinized excessive punitive damage awards on a con-
stitutional plane, cf Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978) (Florida courts 
examine punitive damages for excessiveness but not with reference to the state prohibition 
against excessive fines), they have stated that a prohibition against excessive fines is not limited to 
criminal cases, but also limits legislatively set civil fines and penalties. See State v. Champe, 373 
So. 2d 874, 879 (Fla. 1978) ("the legislature is free to set civil fines and penalties in amounts 
which are not so excessive as to be 'cruel' or 'unusual'"); Amos v. Gunn, 94 So. 615, 641 (Fla. 
1922). 
Nebraska courts, which prohibit punitive damage awards outright, also define punitive dam-
ages as fines or penalties for state constitutional purposes. In Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 
688-89 (Neb. 1960), the court reasoned that punitive damages are fines and as such are unconsti-
tutional since the proceeds benefit a private person and not the school system as mandated by 
article VII, section 5, of the Nebraska Constitution. 104 N.W.2d at 688-89. Absent the prohibi-
tion against punitive damages, Nebraska courts would arguably continue to characterize punitive 
damages as "fines" within the scope of the state's excessive fines clause. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
Moreover, Nebraska courts have long held that punitive damages represent an inappropriate 
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After the Ingraham decision, courts have relied on its broad char-
acterization that the eighth amendment applies to criminal cases only 
and have assumed that its analysis of the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause also controls the excessive fines clause. The Colorado 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co. 81 is typ-
ical of the manner in which courts, both federal and state, have re-
jected the excessive fines argument for punitive damages. In a 
products liability action against the manufacturer of the Dalkon 
Shield intrauterine device, the jury awarded compensatory damages of 
$600,000 and punitive damages of $6,200,000. Relying on Ingraham's 
analysis of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the court dis-
missed the defendant's eighth amendment argument for overlooking 
"the more fundamental proposition that the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause deals exclusively with the criminal process and crimi-
nal punishments."82 While the defendant separately raised the 
excessive fines clause argument, the court assumed that the analysis 
was no different from that of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 
The court made no attempt to examine the history of the excessive 
fines clause or the penal aspects of punitive damages. 
Other courts have been at least as perfunctory as the Palmer court, 
usually relegating the excessive fines clause argument to a footnote. 83 
One court has written, 
The imposition of punitive damage awards, although penal in nature, 
does not approach the severity of criminal sanctions and does not de-
mand the same safeguards as do criminal prosecutions .... The United 
States Supreme Court ... has ... ruled [in Ingraham v. Wright] that the 
Eighth Amendment is generally limited to challenging conditions of a 
intrusion into the state's criminal law function - suggesting that punitive damages would be 
appropriate for scrutiny under the state's excessive fines clause. See Riewe v. McCormick, 9 
N.W. 88, 89-90 (Neb. 1881) (punitive damages are not recoverable since they are in excess of the 
injury and only the state can inflict punishment). 
81. 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984). 
82. 684 P.2d at 217. 
83. E.g., Help Hoboken Hous. v. City of Hoboken, 650 F. Supp. 793, 800 (D.N.J. 1986); 
Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 108 n.129 
(D.S.C. 1979), ajfd. mem., 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981); Dalton v. Bob Neill Pontiac, Inc., 476 
F. Supp. 789, 797 n.13 (M.D.N.C. 1979), ajfd. mem., 628 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1980); State ex rel. 
Brown v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 1 Ohio St. 3d 151, 158 n.5, 438 N.E.2d 120, 125 n.5 (1982); In 
re Garay, 89 N.J. 104, 111-12 & n.7, 444 A.2d 1107, 1111-12 & n.7 (1982) ("[Ingraham] suggests 
that the 'civil' label may be dispositive in the Eighth Amendment context even as to a clearly 
punitive sanction."); Rasky v. Department of Regis. & Educ., 410 N.E.2d 69, 78-79 (Ill. App. 
1980), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 806 (1981); Woolstrum v. Mailloux, 141 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 
9 n.3, 14, 190 Cal. Rptr. 729, 734 n.3, 738 (1983) (listing the "demerits" of punitive damages: 
"Although the remedy is quasi-criminal, the defendant does not have the protections of a crimi-
nal defendant, such as ... prohibition of excessive fines"); Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 
147, 161, 642 P.2d 1305, 1313, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 792 (1982) ("The constitutional safeguards 
applicable in the criminal area do not apply in a case presenting the possible exposure to civil 
penalties."). 
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criminal sentence. 84 
Another court, in a $5 million punitive damage case, simply stated, 
"[T]he Eighth Amendment applies only to criminal actions, not to 
purely civil penalties, as involved here."85 
One explanation for the cursory treatment of the excessive fines 
clause argument is that defendants have not pressed the argument. If 
it is included at all it is usually tacked on to the end of a catalogue of 
other constitutional challenges. 86 Courts accordingly do not grant it 
much attention. 87 
Although no courts since Ingraham have actually held that the 
excessive fines clause protects the punitive damages defendant, some 
courts have taken notice of the argument. The Third Circuit, in In re 
School Asbestos Litigation, 88 noted the growing concerns over the con-
stitutionality of punitive damages, observing that "[t]he parallels be-
tween the assessment of exemplary damages and a fine levied in 
criminal courts have led to suggestions that the concepts of double 
jeopardy and excessive punishment should be invoked in the civil field 
as well."89 The Eighth Circuit, in Wilmington v. J.L Case Co.,90 went 
so far as to question the constitutionality of excessively large punitive 
damages but did not confront the issue.91 The court held that a puni-
tive damage award of ten times the actual damages was neither unfair 
84. Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 346, 355-56, 629 P.2d 196, 
206 (1981). 
85. Downey Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 234 Cal. 
Rptr. 835, 852 (1987) (citing Ingraham v. Wright),petitionfarcert.fi/ed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3115 (U.S. 
July 22, 1987) (No. 87-159). 
86. E.g., Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 355-56, 629 
P.2d 196, 206 (1981). 
87. E.g., State ex rel Brown v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 1 Ohio St. 3d 151, 158 n.5, 438 
N.E.2d 120, 125 n.5 (1982) ("[The defendant] makes a passing reference in its brief to the prohi-
bition against 'excessive fines' ... [but] does not, however, explain why we should apply this 
language in the civil context."). 
88. 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986). The case involved certification of a nationwide mandatory 
plaintiff class for punitive damages. The Third Circuit vacated the district court's class certifica-
tion for the punitive damages plaintiffs. 
89. 789 F.2d at 1004 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986)). Although 
the court accorded considerable discussion to different arguments attacking the constitutionality 
of punitive damages, it held that certification of a nationwide punitive damages class was im-
proper where there was no showing of potential abuses that would implicate constitutional pro-
tections. 789 F.2d at 1003-05. 
90. 793 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1986). 
91. The court, citing Jeffries, supra note 6, noted "the existence of a growing body of aca-
demic work suggesting that punitive damages may be unconstitutional. In the present case, 
however, the constitutional issue has not been raised, and thus we do not consider this interesting 
and significant question." 793 F.2d at 922 n.10 (citation omitted). Although the court did not 
specify the possible grounds for finding punitive damages unconstitutional, its citation of the 
Jeffries article would suggest either a due process basis or the excessive fines clause argument. 
See Jeffries, supra note 6, at 140. Because the Wilmington case did not involve multiple punitive 
damage awards, the court was necessarily referring to Jeffries' argument against punitive dam-
ages as excessive fines rather than his due process attack of multiple punitive damages in mass 
tort litigation. The import of the court's footnote is unclear. The comment could be a mere 
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nor shocking.92 The Sixth Circuit has also expressed some concern 
over excessive punitive damage awards.93 None of these federal 
courts, however, were required to address the excessive fines clause 
argument. Of those states that have stated or implied that the exces-
sive fines clause applies to punitive damages, none have confronted the 
language in Ingraham. 94 
III. MISPLACED RELIANCE ON INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT 
While Ingraham v. Wright is factually distinguishable from an ex-
cessive fines clause/punitive damages case,95 it is distinguishable on 
more fundamental grounds: the case involved neither the excessive 
fines clause nor punitive damages. The Court restricted its historical 
inquiry to the cruel and unusual punishment clause and did not extend 
its reasoning to forms of punishment outside the scope of that clause. 
For a court to conclude that the excessive fines clause is inapposite in a 
punitive damages case, it should undertake first a historical analysis of 
whether the scope of the excessive fines clause includes noncriminal 
punishments and, second, an inquiry as to whether punitive damages 
are sufficiently penal to warrant constitutional protections of the 
eighth amendment. Courts have avoided both inquiries by resorting to 
the broad language of Ingraham. 
observation or it could be a deliberate indication that in the proper context the court might find 
an excessive punitive damage award unconstitutional under the excessive fines clause. 
92. 793 F.2d at 922. 
93. See Womack v. Gettelfinger, 808 F.2d 446, 451-52 (6th Cir. 1986). 
94. Texas courts have held that their prohibition against excessive fines extends to civil pen-
alties, implying perhaps that punitive damages are likewise subject to scrutiny. In Pennington v. 
Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (fex. 1980), the Texas Supreme Court applied the state's excessive 
fines clause to a treble damage award paid to a private party under the state's consumer protec-
tion act. 606 S.W.2d at 690 (relying on State v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 100 Tex. 153, 97 S.W. 
71 (1906), revd. on other grounds, 210 U.S. 217 (1908)). The court treated treble damages as a 
fine within the meaning of the state constitution but held that the award was not constitutionally 
excessive. 606 S.W.2d at 690-91. Nevertheless, it appears that Texas courts have not addressed 
punitive damages on excessive fines grounds. 
Apparently no other courts have gone as far as the Texas courts, but some have suggested 
that they might. See note 80 supra. Several justices of the Alabama Supreme Court have appar-
ently accepted the excessive fines clause argument in light of the Supreme Court's dicta in Aetna 
v. Lavoie. See note 22 supra and text at notes 17-22 supra. 
95. First, factual considerations peculiar to the spanking of schoolchildren would not be per-
tinent to a test of the excessive fines clause. In Ingraham, the availability of civil and criminal 
remedies for excessive punishments rendered the constitutional issue less acute. 430 U.S. at 661, 
677-78. Secondly, the Court felt that advance procedural protections would create a burden 
which would outweigh any added benefit. 430 U.S. 680-82. School discipline would be difficult if 
prior hearings were necessary before any punishment could be administered. 
These factors would not apply to punitive damages assessed in the course of a civil trial. 
There could be no subsequent liability for imposing an excessively large punitive award. Who 
would the defendant sue? What cause of action would he have? The procedural protections 
contemplated in Ingraham would not apply to a punitive damage award. Spanking schoolchil-
dren is far different from assessing monetary penalties in a formal civil trial. It would be impossi-
ble and inappropriate to translate the context of a punitive damage award into the context of 
Ingraham. 
1714 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 85:1699 
A. History of the Excessive Fines Clause 
To discern the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause, the Supreme Court in Ingraham examined the history of the 
eighth amendment; the same analysis is appropriate for the excessive 
fines clause.96 Historical analysis of the excessive fines clause necessar-
ily focuses on the origins and meaning of the "fine" and the context in 
which a "fine" could arise. The analysis reveals that the word "fine" 
has not always had its modem meaning. It evolved from the "amerce-
ment" - a monetary penalty paid to the Crown as punishment for 
civil or criminal misconduct. 
Like the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the excessive fines 
clause has a long history that extends back to the Magna Carta of 
1215 and the English Bill of Rights of 1689.97 The principle underly-
ing the excessive fines clause originated in Chapter 20 of the Magna 
Carta which prohibited "amercements," monetary penalties assessed 
for lesser offenses against the Crown, that were disproportionate to a 
wrongdoer's offense or that would deprive him of his means of liveli-
hood. 98 The chapter provided: 
A freeman shall not be amerced for a slight offence, except in accord-
ance with the degree of the offence; and for a grave offence he shall be 
amerced in accordance with the gravity of the offence, yet saving always 
his "contenement"; and a merchant in the same way, saving his "mer-
chandise"; and a villien shall be amerced in the same way, saving his 
"wainage" - if they have fallen into our mercy: and none of the afore-
said amercements shall be imposed except by the oath of honest men of 
the neighbourhood.99 
A court levied an amercement upon finding an offender guilty of a 
minor offense and declaring him in the "king's mercy." 100 In a private 
suit, the court would amerce a plaintiff for his false claim if he did not 
96. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670-71 n.39 ("The applicability of the Eighth Amendment 
always has turned on its original meaning, as demonstrated by its historical derivation."). 
97. 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *378-79; R. PERRY & J. COOPER, supra note 71, at 
235-36, 430. See generally Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Orig-
inal Meaning, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 845-47 (1969); Jeffries, supra note 6, at 154-57. The 
Supreme Court has sketched out some of the history of the eighth amendment in Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-28 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), and in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277, 284-86 (1983). 
98. See W. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 284-93 (2d ed. 1914). Webster's defines "amerce" 
as "to punish by a pecuniary penalty the amount of which is not fixed by law but is left to the 
discretion of the court." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 68 (1981). 
99. MAGNA CARTA ch. 20 (1215), translated in W. MCKECHNIE, supra note 98, at 284. 
Chapter 20 of the Magna Carta was later renumbered as Chapter 14. See Granucci, supra note 
97, at 845 n.29. Chapters 21and22 of the Magna Carta also express this principle of proportion-
ality but apply to nobles and clergy. See W. McKECHNIE, supra note 98, at 295, 298. 
100. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 513 (2d ed. 1952); \V, 
MCKECHNIE, supra note 98, at 286. 
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prevail.101 If the defendant lost, the court amerced him for his mis-
conduct or for disobeying the command of the original writ. 102 As-
sessing an amercement was a two-step process: First, the court would 
provisionally assess the penalty, and thereafter a jury of twelve neigh-
bors would adjust the amercement as the misconduct and the wrong-
doer's ability to pay warranted.103 The amercement would then be 
paid to the court. The amercements were generally small but fre-
quently assessed.104 
Although loosely considered the equivalent of a modern criminal 
fine, 105 the amercement, at the time of the Magna Carta, was distinct 
from the criminal fine. 106 The fine, as the term was used at the time of 
the Magna Carta, operated as a substitute for imprisonment. The 
court, having no actual power to impose a fine, would sentence the 
wrongdoer to prison. To avoid imprisonment, the wrongdoer could 
then "make fine" by "voluntarily" contracting with the Crown to pay 
money, thereby ending the matter. 107 The Crown gradually elimi-
nated the voluntary nature of the fine by imposing indefinite sentences 
upon wrongdoers who effectively would be forced to pay the fine. Once 
the fine was no longer voluntary, it became the equivalent of an 
amercement. As a result, the use of the term "amercement" gradually 
dropped from ordinary usage as the term "fine" took on its modern 
meaning108 - a meaning that more closely resembles the meaning of 
101. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *274-75, *376, *398. The Supreme Court has 
described the process of assessing amercements in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524-25 (1927). 
102. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *398. 
Offenses punished in the course of civil actions. Every tort, nay, every cause of civil action, 
was a punishable offence. Every vanquished defendant, even though the action was 'real' or 
was contractual, had earned punishment. At the least he had been guilty of an unjust deten-
tion .... In the lower courts he could only be - but he would be - amerced. 
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 519. 
103. W. MCKECHNIE, supra note 98, at 288; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 100, 
at 513. 
104. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 513; w. MCKECHNIE, supra note 98, 
at 287. 
105. In translating Chapter 20 of the Magna Carta, some have equated amercements with 
fines. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 284 n.8.; R. PERRY & J. COOPER, supra note 71, at 
15. 
106. In the thirteenth century, these terms were sharply contrasted. "Amercement" was 
applied to sums imposed in punishment of misdeeds; the Jaw-breaker had no option of refus-
ing, and no voice in fixing the amount. "Fine,'' on the contrary, was used for voluntary 
offerings made to the King to obtain some favour or to escape punishment. Here the initia-
tive rested with the individual, who suggested the amount to be paid, and was, indeed, under 
no legal obligation to make any offer at all. This distinction between fines and amercements, 
absolute in theory, could readily be obliterated in practice. 
W. MCKECHNIE, supra note 98, at 292-93. 
107. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 517. See Note, Fines, Imprisonment, 
and the Poor: "Thirty Days or Thirty Dollars'~ 57 CALlF. L. R.Ev. 778, 783-86 (1969). 
108. W. McKECHNlE, supra note 98, at 293; see Note, supra note 107, at 784-85 (noting the 
verbal change from "making fine" to "being fined"). New York, in its Bill of Rights, has re-
tained the term "amercement" along with "fine": "No citizen of this state ought to be fined or 
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"amercement" than the old meaning of "fine."I09 
Since the amercement originated at a time when little distinction 
existed between tort law and criminal law, it was neither strictly a civil 
nor a criminal sanction. 110 It could arise in either a case brought by 
the Crown or a case between two private parties. After the tort and 
criminal law systems diverged, the principle of proportionality 
spanned both. It operated as a limitation on punishment rather than 
on the nature of the proceeding. William Blackstone, writing in the 
eighteenth century, distinguished between fines and amercements 
based upon the setting but acknowledged the analogous policy gov-
erning each: 
The reasonableness of fines in criminal cases has also been usually 
regulated by the determination of Magna Carta ... concerning amerce-
ments for misbehavior by the suitors in matters of civil right. 111 
Like imprisonment, the amercement was simply a means of punishing 
misconduct, regardless of whether it arose in actions that today would 
be considered criminal or civil. 112 The Magna Carta established a gen-
eral principle that punishment must be in proportion to the offense. 113 
In 1689, the English adopted their Bill of Rights in reaction to the 
judicial excesses in criminal cases under the reign of James II. 114 The 
Bill of Rights provided, "That excessive bail ought not to be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted. "115 This provision elucidated the enduring principle that 
originated in the Magna Carta: the right to be free from excessive or 
disproportionate punishment, including excessive pecuniary punish-
amerced without reasonable cause, and such fine or amercement should always be proportioned 
to the nature of the offense." N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW§ 11 (McKinney 1976). 
109. For instance, Webster's recognizes the metamorphosis of the "fine,'' defining it as "a 
sum formerly paid as compensation or for exemption from punishment but now imposed as 
punishment for a crime." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 852 (1981). 
110. 2 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 363, 365 (3d ed. 1923); 3 W.S. 
HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 328; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *376, *398; 4 w. BLACK· 
STONE, supra, at *372; W. MCKECHNIE, supra note 98, at 285; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, 
supra note 100, at 511-12, 523-25. 
111. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *379 (emphasis added). 
112. "Every tort, nay, every cause of civil action, was a punishable offence." 2 F. POLLOCK 
& F. MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 519. 
113. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). Immediately after discussing the clause in 
the English Bill of Rights prohibiting excessive fines, Blackstone observed that the reasonableness 
of criminal fines is the same as the reasonableness of amercements in civil cases. 4 W. BLACK· 
STONE, supra note 97, at *378-79. 
114. R. PERRY & J. COOPER, supra note 71, at 222-24. 
115. ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS, 1 Wm. & Mary, sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689), reprinted in R. PERRY 
& J. COOPER, supra note 71, at 247. An early draft included a reference to "persons committed 
in criminal cases" relating to the prohibition against excessive bail. See Granucci, supra note 97, 
at 855-56. The phrase was dropped in the final version. It is unclear whether the omission of the 
reference is of any significance since the preamble retains a similar reference. Compare Ingraham 
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665 & n.33 (1977), with Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 685 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
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ments. 116 Since it incorporated the earlier prohibition against exces-
sive amercements - which could arise in civil settings - as well as 
other forms of punishment, the pronouncement that "excessive fines 
[ought not to be] imposed" cannot be limited to strictly criminal cases 
but extends to monetary sanctions imposed in both criminal and civil 
contexts.117 The drafters of the American Bill of Rights copied· the 
entire eighth amendment from section nine of the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights of 1776, which had incorporated the English text. 118 In 
adopting the English text, the framers of the American Bill of Rights 
intended to ensure, at a minimum, those rights possessed by the Eng-
lish.119 The principal impetus for adopting the amendment was to an-
swer the complaints of some that the original Constitution failed to 
limit the degree of punishment for those convicted of crimes.120 In 
doing so, the framers also incorporated the amendment's historical 
contours, including the broader scope of the excessive fines clause. 
Numerous eighth amendment cases have been decided by the 
Supreme Court - most involving the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause.121 While a few criminal cases have been decided under the 
excessive fines clause, 122 the Court has never decided a civil case under 
the clause.123 Despite this dearth of case law, the Supreme Court has 
116. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 284-86; Granucci, supra note 97, at 845-47. See gener-
ally 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *12-19 (writing on the proportionality of punishments). 
117. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *379 ("the Bill of Rights was only declaratory of 
the old constitutional law"); Granucci, supra note 97, at 847 ("Thus, prior to adoption of the Bill 
of Rights in 1689 England had developed a common law prohibition against excessive punish-
ments in any form."). 
118. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 & n.10 (1983). R. PERRY & J. COOPER, supra 
note 71, at 311-12, 423. 
119. When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the language of the English 
Bill of Rights, they also adopted the English principle of proportionality. Indeed, one of the 
consistent themes of the era was that Americans had all the rights of English subjects. Thus 
our Bill of Rights was designed in part to ensure that these rights were preserved. . . . [The 
Framers] intended to provide at least the same protection - including the right to be free 
from excessive punishments. 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 285-86 (footnotes & citations omitted). 
120. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 & n.35 (1977). 
121. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (capital punishment); Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153 (1976) (capital punishment); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (cruel and unu-
sual punishments clause prohibits life imprisonment without possibility of parole for a nonviolent 
felony); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (divestiture of citizenship is penal, thereby violating 
the cruel and unusual punishment clause). 
122. E.g., Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Texas, 246 
U.S. 58 (1918). 
123. In several cases, the Court has discussed the excessive fines clause without deciding its 
scope. In Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833), the petitioner, a federal prisoner, sought 
a writ of habeas corpus and argued in part that the criminal fine imposed was excessive and 
contrary to the excessive fines clause. 32 U.S. at 573. The Court noted, "The eighth amendment 
is addressed to courts of the United States exercising criminal jurisdiction, and is doubtless 
mandatory to them and a limitation upon their discretion." 32 U.S. at 573-74. This statement is 
only a declaratory preface to the Court's holding that it was without proper appellate jurisdiction 
to revise the fine. 32 U.S. at 574. Because the Court did not address the question of whether the 
excessive fines clause applies to civil cases, no court has since relied on Ex parte Watkins for that 
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continuously recognized the eighth amendment as restating the 
Magna Carta's principle of proportionality. In Solem v. Helm, 124 the 
Court examined the history of the eighth amendment - citing the 
Magna Carta's rule against excessive amercements - and concluded 
that the framers of the amendment implicitly had incorporated the 
longstanding principle of proportionality in punishments.125 
Historical analysis of the excessive fines clause in light of contem-
porary punitive damage awards is problematic. English courts at the 
time of the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights and United 
States courts at the time of the American Bill of Rights had not out-
lined the basis for punitive damages and certainly did not contemplate 
awards reaching millions and even billions of dollars.126 It is difficult 
to say conclusively that the history of the eighth amendment does or 
does not bring punitive damages within the scope of the excessive fines 
clause. 
The history does support at least two plausible arguments that pu-
nitive damages fall within the scope of the excessive fines clause as 
contemplated in the English Bill of Rights. One argument is that the 
Magna Carta - as the source of the excessive fines clause - specifi-
cally included civilly assessed sanctions within the scope of its prohibi-
tion of disproportionate punishments. While amercements do differ 
from punitive damages in that the amercement was paid to the state 
rather than the plaintiff, other attributes are similar: The principal 
purpose of each is to punish the wrongdoer; both are generally as-
sessed by a jury; both are mandatory upon the wrongdoer; and both 
arise in the civil context. The fine, originally negotiated between the 
wrongdoer and the Crown, eventually became a mandatory penalty, 
proposition, although some litigants have argued that this case does restrict the clause's applica· 
tion to the criminal context. Brieffor Appellee at 33, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 
1580 (1986) (No. 84-1601). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1972). 
124. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
125. 463 U.S. at 284-86. 
126. Whether English courts would have treated punitive damages as analogous to amerce· 
ments within the meaning of the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights is uncertain. At the time of 
the adoption of the English Bill of Rights in 1689, punitive damages paid to private parties were 
virtually unknown. Not until the eighteenth century did courts outline the basis for punitive 
damages. K. REDDEN, supra note 26, § 2.2(A)(2) nn. 15-16 (citing two 1763 English cases as the 
first explicit articulation of punitive damages: Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763), 
and Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763)). Before the English Bill of Rights, some 
cases did involve jury awards above the actual physical injury to the plaintiff. However, these 
awards were usually double or treble damages for offenses such as adultery and the cutting off of 
plaintiff's ear. E.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *140 (exemplary damages for adul· 
tery); Id. at *121 (treble damages for severed ear). See also Owen, Punitive Damages in Products 
Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1263 & n.18 (1976). As such, courts arguably did 
not view these awards as testing the limits of excessiveness. Therefore, punitive damages, more· 
over excessively high awards, were not of any significance at the time and would not have been 
contemplated in drafting the excessive fines language of the English Bill of Rights. 
Likewise, in the United States, the doctrine of punitive damages was virtually unknown at the 
time of the drafting of the Bill of Rights. See K. REDDEN, supra note 26, § 2.3(B). 
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thereby subsuming the amercement. Therefore, punitive damages, as 
civil monetary sanctions, are sufficiently analogous to amercements to 
invoke the Magna Carta's prohibition against excessive amercements 
and the English Bill of Rights' prohibition against excessive fines. 
A second interpretation would read the clause's roots in the 
Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights as evincing the broader 
principle that punishment in any form must be in proportion to the 
misconduct. The Magna Carta limited punitive sanctions that were 
disproportionate and that would deprive the defendant of his liveli-
hood. Therefore, an excessively large punitive damage award, assessed 
in order to punish the defendant, would subvert the intent of this es-
tablished principle.127 Under this interpretation, the amendment fo-
cuses upon the punishment, whereas the other criminal safeguards 
focus on the process through which punishment is imposed. 128 
In contrast, the history of the excessive fines clause could be and 
has been interpreted as imposing restraints only upon excessive crimi-
nal sanctions without reference to civil punitive sanctions. Most 
courts have assumed the latter interpretation, primarily because it is 
consistent with and parallels the other two clauses of the eighth 
amendment. 129 From this assumption, the conclusion necessarily fol-
lows that the Supreme Court's Ingraham interpretation of the cruel 
and unusual punishment clause restricts the excessive fines clause to 
the criminal setting. However, this interpretation ignores much of the 
history of the clause that supports the two former interpretations and 
that is not addressed in Ingraham. 130 
B. The Penal Nature of Punitive Damages 
By relying on Ingraham's historical analysis of the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause and the "civil" label attached to punitive dam-
ages, courts have avoided the question, raised by Ingraham, of 
whether punitive damages are "sufficiently analogous to criminal pun-
ishments" to invoke eighth amendment protection. To answer this 
question, courts should examine the functional nature of the sane-
127. In a case decided the same year as the enactment of the English Bill of Rights, the 
House of Lords reiterated the broad principle prohibiting excessiveness in punishments. 
Although the case did involve a fine paid to the Crown, the decision reflects an attitude that 
would arguably encompass any excessive pecuniary penalty, including punitive damages. The 
House of Lords stated that "the fine of 30,000/ ... was excessive and exorbitant, against Magna 
Charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law of the land.' " Case of the Earl of 
Devonshire, 11 State Tr. (Howell) 1367, 1370 (1689). 
. 
128. This is the approach Justice White takes in his Ingraham dissent, noting that eighth 
amendment scrutiny of "punishments" would -not necessarily invoke the procedural guarantees 
of the "criminal" process. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 686 & n.2. (1977) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
129. See section 11.B, supra. 
130. Both arguments are suggested in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1059 
n.l (Ala. 1987) (Maddox, J., concurring specially). 
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tion131 and not merely the label attached.132 
The Supreme Court's decision in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 133 
is the most widely cited test for determining whether a sanction is suf-
ficiently penal as to invoke some or all protections. 134 In Kennedy, the 
Supreme Court recognized that certain punitive measures may not be 
constitutionally imposed without criminal protections. 135 The Court 
determined that automatic forfeiture of citizenship provisions of the 
immigration laws amounted to punishment that could not be imposed 
without due process oflaw.136 The Court listed seven factors for con-
sideration in determining whether a sanction is punitive: 
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
[2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, 
[3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether 
its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribu-
tion and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is al-
ready a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned .... 137 
While this list is "neither exhaustive nor dispositive,"138 the 
Supreme Court has afforded it considerable weight. 139 Commentators 
applying the Kennedy factors to punitive damages have concluded that 
most, if not all, of the factors qualify punitive damages as penal in 
nature and deserving of certain constitutional protections.140 While 
131. For instance, in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), the Supreme Court scruti-
nized the civil penalty to determine whether it was "so punitive as to 'transfor[m] what was 
clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.' "448 U.S. at 249 (quoting Rex Trailer 
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)). See 448 U.S. at 253-55; Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 
669 n.37; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) ("[P]roceedings instituted for the 
purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offenses committed by him, 
though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal.''); cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
94-97 (1958). 
132. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 94 ("How simple would be the tasks of constitutional 
adjudication and of law generally if specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels 
pasted on them!"). 
133. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
134. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365-66 & n.7 
(1984); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 998-99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. 
Ct. 562 (1986); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commn., 518 F.2d 
990, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1975). See Grass, supra note 14, at 245-48; Jeffries, supra note 6, at 150. 
Courts, however, have not applied this test to punitive damages. See Grass, supra note 14, at 
245-46. 
135. 372 U.S. at 167. See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979). 
136. 372 U.S. at 165-70, 186. 
137. 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). 
138. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980). 
139. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249-51; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 537-39. 
140. In an extensive analysis of Kennedy and the supporting cases, Grass concludes that all 
seven factors apply to punitive damages. Grass, supra note 14. Two others conclude that all but 
the first factor are satisfied. Jeffries, supra note 6, at 150-51; Wheeler, supra note 14, at 349. 
Another commentator, while querying whether the Kennedy test strictly applies, contends that 
under the Kennedy test or one like it punitive damages are penal and should not be assessed 
June 1987] Note - Punitive Damages 1721 
all seven factors may arguably not apply, most would seem to qualify 
punitive damages for penal status. 
The applicability of the first factor, whether the sanction involves 
an affirmative disability or restraint, turns on the definition of "disabil-
ity or restraint." The Court intended "disability or restraint" to en-
compass more than actual imprisonment.141 Whether the factor 
extends to large monetary damages is unresolved. Although two 
members of the Court have found that moderately sized civil penalties 
do not qualify as a restraint or disability, 142 some lower courts have 
characterized certain monetary sanctions as restraints. 143 Arguably, 
excessively large punitive damages could be as severe as imprisonment. 
For example, a multi-billion dollar award, such as that in the Texaco-
Pennzoil litigation, would certainly restrain a corporation's activities, 
if not force it into bankruptcy.144 Likewise, a large monetary judg-
ment may be as severe to a poor defendant as a jail term. 145 
The second and fourth factors, whether punitive damages have his-
torically been regarded as punishment and whether they will promote 
retribution and deterrence, are also satisfied. The very label "puni-
tive" manifests the penal nature of punitive damages. Courts have his-
torically imposed punitive damages to punish a culpable defendant. 146 
The vast majority of courts, including the Supreme Court, 147 recog-
without certain constitutional protections. K. REDDEN, supra note 26, § 7.2, at 607-08. Cf. 
United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D. Fla. 1972) (court found civil fine to be 
penal under all Kennedy factors). 
141. The Court cited cases that involved restraints other than imprisonment. See Ex parte 
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1866) (exclusion from the practice oflaw viewed as punish-
ment); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946) (permanent prohibition from govern-
ment service is a severe punishment); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (denial of 
non-contractual government benefit imposes no affirmative disability or restraint). 
142. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. at 256 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
143. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commn., 518 F.2d 990, 
1001 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[E]ven though monetary penalties do not fit within the conventional defi-
nition of disability, .•. they do inflict a pocket-book deterrence or restraint on the recipient."), 
affd., 430 U.S. 442 (1977); United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D. Fla. 1972); 
United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521, 529 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd. in part, 
revd. in part, 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974). But see United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. 
Supp. 1151, 1161 (D. Conn. 1975) (finding that Kennedy did not intend to include monetary 
sanction as a "restraint"). 
144. See Texaco, Fighting Pennzoil Attack, Asks Bankruptcy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1987, at 
1, col. 5. 
145. 1 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 32, § 1.3(a), at 16-17; Clark, supra note 14, at 
406; Grass, supra note 14, at 252. The burden of a huge debt would certainly restrict, if not 
terminate, a defendant's financial activities. 
146. E.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir. 1986); Day v. Wood-
worth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) ("courts permit ... [punitive damages] by way of 
punishment or example, which [have] sometimes been called 'smart money'"); K. REDDEN, 
supra note 26, § 2.3(A), at 31-32. 
147. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (punitive damages are "private 
fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence"). 
1722 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1699 
nize that punitive damages serve the functions of retribution and 
deterrence. 148 
Although standards vary, 149 the third Kennedy factor, a finding of 
scienter, is a required element for a punitive damage award.1so In all 
jurisdictions, a punitive damage inquiry focuses on the reprehensible 
nature of a defendant's misconduct, which must entail an element of 
knowing wrongdoing, such as malice, evil motive, willfulness, or gross 
negligence, to warrant punitive damages.1s1 
The fifth factor, whether the behavior giving rise to the action is 
already criminalized, varies from case to case. While punitive dam-
ages may be assessed where the misconduct is not a crime, they are 
often assessed where the conduct is also subject to criminal prosecu-
tion.1s2 Some statutes even make recovery of punitive damages con-
tingent on a felony conviction.1s3 In other cases, punitive damage 
suits are substitutes for criminal prosecution - a means of deputizing 
"private attorneys general."1s4 However, other conduct subject to pu-
nitive damages, such as breach of contract, may not be subject to crim-
inal prosecution. But insofar as punitive damages substitute for 
criminal punishment, the absence of any corresponding criminal liabil-
ity should not prevent a court from concluding that a sanction is pe-
nal. A court should be more concerned if the state is circumventing 
the criminal process by labeling a sanction noncriminal when it is re-
ally criminal. 
The sixth factor considers whether there is an alternative purpose 
for punitive damages. 1ss Some courts have held that the government 
is permitted to exact high civil penalties as a means of recovering gen-
eral investigation and legal costs incurred in pursuing the defendant 
148. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 33, at 9 & n.21, and cases cited therein; 1 J. 
GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 14, § 4.14, at 15-16 (1985 & Supp. 1986). Cf. Helvering v. 
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1938) (proceeding is criminal where there is intent to punish). 
149. 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 14, § 5.01. 
150. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 33, at 9-10. 
151. 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 14, § 5.01. See also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 
30, 56 (1983) (punitive damages under§ 1983 permitted "when the defendant's conduct is shown 
to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the 
federally protected rights of others"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) 
(plaintiff may not recover punitive damages in a defamation action against a publisher or broad-
caster without a showing that defendant had either knowledge of statement's falsity or reckless 
disregard of its truth or falsity). 
152. See Grass, supra note 14, at 288-96. 
153. E.g., CAL. C1v. CODE§ 3294(d) (Deering 1984) (permitting exemplary damages on be-
half of felony-murder victims). 
154. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985) ("Private attorney general 
provisions ... are in part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps."). See also Ausness, supra note 24, 
at 69-70; Owen, supra note 126, at 1287-88. 
155. A handful of courts view punitive damages as compensatory: as such, the label "puni-
tive" would be a misnomer and such damages would properly be nonpenal. See Ausness, supra 
note 24, at 67-69. 
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and others like him; 156 however, this rationale would not apply to pri-
vate citizens recovering punitive damages in a single lawsuit where the 
penalties recovered are much greater than costs. Furthermore, exces-
sive civil sanctions are less likely where the government is the plaintiff 
and is constrained by statute and the political process. 157 Another role 
of punitive damages is to encourage private individuals to prosecute 
misconduct. This goal cannot be seen as an alternative since the un-
derlying purpose of the scheme continues to be the punishment of 
wrongdoers. 158 Excessively large punitive damage awards serve no 
other significant purpose than to punish and deter misconduct, 
thereby satisfying the sixth Kennedy consideration. 
Absent a substantial nonpunitive purpose, punitive damages 
greater than uncompensated costs must necessarily satisfy the seventh 
Kennedy factor - excessiveness in serving an alternative purpose. 
Often punitive damage awards dwarf amounts needed to achieve any 
possible purpose other than punishment. For instance, in the case of 
civil penalties, a treble damages provision may be reasonable as a 
means of recovering general prosecutorial costs; however, litigation 
cost recovery cannot justify punitive damages where awards reach 
hundreds or even thousands of times the actual costs incurred. 
Under the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez analysis, an excessively 
large punitive damage award is a penal sanction. It is difficult to es-
cape this conclusion in light of the weight of authority that has histori-
cally regarded punitive damages as principally serving the criminal 
law aims of punishing and deterring egregious misconduct. Punitive 
damages are what they are labeled - punitive. 
If courts can look beyond the language in Ingraham and find that 
punitive damages are penal in nature, defendants should be entitled to 
certain constitutional protections, 159 including that of the excessive 
fines clause. 160 Determining what is constitutionally excessive may be 
156. E.g., In re Garay, 89 N.J. 104, 114, 444 A2d 1107, 1112 (1982) (purpose of civil pen-
alty is to recover costs of fraud investigations and legal proceedings). 
157. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commn., 518 F.2d 990, 
1003-09 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing civil penalty statutes), affd., 430 U.S. 442 (1977). CJ United 
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980) (congressional intent behind civil penalty provision in 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was nonpunitive); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1982) (limit-
ing civil penalty to $5,000 for each violation of the Clean Water Act). 
158. Ausness, supra note 24, at 69-70. 
159. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-51. The Supreme Court has held that crimi-
nal safeguards can arise in proceedings labeled civil. E.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144 (1963) (safeguards of the fifth and sixth amendments apply to forfeiture of citizenship); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (fourth and fifth amendments prohibit compulsory 
forfeiture of fraudulently imported merchandise); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 
380 U.S. 693 (1965) (exclusionary rule applies to forfeiture under state liquor laws); see Wheeler, 
supra note 14, at 324-33. But see Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926) (fifth amendment 
safeguard against double jeopardy does not apply to occupancy injunctions subsequent to crimi-
nal acquittal under National Prohibition Act). 
160. See Charney, supra note 14; Clark, supra note 14; Comment, Criminal Safeguards, 
supra note 13. CJ In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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a difficult task but one that is required. 161 Certain protections already 
exist whereby a court may overturn an excessive award. 162 Other pro-
tections could be implemented to constrain punitive damage verdicts 
further. 163 Whatever the measure, by elevating the scrutiny to a con-
stitutional plane, the courts may more carefully examine those puni-
tive damage awards that exceed the bounds of reasonableness and 
proportionality. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is not surprising that the framers of the English and American 
Bills of Rights did not contemplate that punitive damages would de-
serve excessive fines clause scrutiny, but the underlying principle of 
the clause, derived from the Magna Carta, implies an intention to per-
mit only punishments that are proportional to the misconduct. As 
Chief Justice Warren said in Trop v. Dulles, "[T]he words of the 
[Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and ... their scope is not static. 
The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."164 Contem-
161. Cf. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987) (grossly disproportion-
ate forfeiture required by federal racketeering laws may violate the eighth amendment): 
[The constitutional boundary of excessiveness] is, admittedly, not an easy line to draw; the 
eighth amendment does not provide a bright line separating punishment that is permissible 
from that which is not. But a court may not tum its back on a constitutional constraint 
simply because it is difficult to apply. 
162. Most courts may upset punitive damages awards for excessiveness. See 2 J. GHIARDI & 
J. KIRCHER, supra note 14, §§ 18.01-.10. Most courts require that the award bear a reasonable 
relation to the actual damages. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Ap· 
proach, 31 HAsTINGS L.J. 639, 666 (1980). This "reasonable relation" standard is inadequate 
because courts may not be willing to overturn jury determinations, thereby permitting constitu-
tionally abusive verdicts. In the context of mass tort litigation, past and potential punitive 
awards might not be considered, thereby subjecting the defendant to multiple and repetitive puni-
tive awards. If the amount of the award threatens to surpass a constitutional limit, courts should 
examine the verdict with greater scrutiny than is required under the reasonable relation test. 
163. Commentators and courts have proposed more sophisticated yardsticks for assessing 
punitive damages than the reasonable relation test. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 162, at 667-69; 
Owen, supra note 126, at 1369. Courts could limit awards based upon particular factors or a 
combination of factors: for example, the severity of the threatened harm, the egregiousness of 
the misconduct or its profitability, the defendant's financial position, the amount of the actual 
damages and litigation costs, potential criminal sanctions, and other legal actions based upon the 
same misconduct. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 162, at 667-69. 
Legislatures could enact statutes setting the maximum amount of a punitive award based 
upon a fixed ceiling, the type and egregiousness of the misconduct, or as a set proportion of the 
actual damages incurred. Wheeler, supra note 14, at 298-300. Courts could bifurcate trials -
the first phase determining liability and the second determining punitive measures. Id. at 300-02. 
While juries would retain the role of assessing liability and actual damages, judges could assume 
the role of fixing punitive damages, thereby allowing determinations based upon other relevant 
information such as prior punitive awards against the same defendant arising out of the same 
misconduct, comparative awards from within and without the jurisdiction, and, most impor· 
tantly, the constitutional boundaries of such awards. Id. at 302-03; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 
162, at 664-65. 
164. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). 
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porary punitive damage awards are often large enough to raise serious 
constitutional questions. 
While the history of and the decisions involving the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause were sufficient to persuade a majority of the 
Supreme Court in Ingraham that the clause was inapplicable to the 
spanking of schoolchildren, such a conclusion does not flow from an 
analysis of the excessive fines clause with respect to punitive damages. 
First, the history of the excessive fines clause more strongly supports 
the argument that the clause applies outside the criminal context than 
does the history of the cruel and unusual punishment clause.165 While 
the cruel and unusual punishment and excessive bail clauses are 
closely tied to the criminal law, the excessive fines clause finds its roots 
in both civil and criminal settings; therefore, its scope should not be 
limited to strictly criminal fines. Second, the penal dimensions of pu-
nitive damages are also more significant than those of a schoolroom 
spanking.166 Punitive damages are closely analogous to criminal fines, 
whereas spankings are hardly comparable to punishments that would 
be considered "cruel and unusual." While little danger exists that 
punishment of schoolchildren could reach constitutional propor-
tions, 167 punitive damages are less controlled and can reach dispropor-
tionate amounts. 
An examination of the history of the excessive fines clause and the 
purpose of punitive damages indicates that punitive damages should 
fall within the scope of the excessive fines clause. A historical exami-
nation shows that the excessive fines clause represents the longstand-
ing principle that punishments must be in proportion to the 
misconduct. This principle focuses not on the criminal process but on 
the punitive process. Since the excessive fines clause embodies this 
principle of proportionality, the relevant inquiry is whether the sanc-
tion is intended as punishment and not whether the underlying offense 
is labeled criminal. If the sanction is penal, then the excessive fines 
clause applies, regardless of the setting. 
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court outlined a 
seven-factor test for determining whether a sanction is penal. The test 
usually involves safeguards that are textually linked to the criminal 
process.168 In those cases the appropriate question that the test ad-
dresses is whether the sanction is sufficiently penal to require criminal 
procedural protections. In the case of the excessive fines clause, the 
criminal/civil label should not be determinative. The relevant inquiry 
under Kennedy is whether the sanction is associated with punishment 
165. See section III.A supra. 
166. See section 111.B supra. 
167. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670 n.39. 
168. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 164-65 ("rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments are 'preserved to every one accused of crime' "). 
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rather than with some other purpose.169 The sanction would not nec-
essarily have to be so penal as to rise to a level requiring all the consti-
tutional protections strictly associated with the criminal process. 170 
Punitive damages, if examined under the Kennedy test, are cer-
tainly penal sanctions - most, if not all, of the seven factors are satis-
fied. If punitive damages are punishment and if the excessive fines 
clause requires proportionality in all punishments, then the excessive 
fines clause should protect the defendant from excessive punitive dam-
age awards. 
By not subjecting punitive damages to constitutional scrutiny, we 
create an anomalous situation - the label attached determines 
whether the defendant has certain constitutional protections. The 
criminal defendant is immunized from constitutionally excessive 
fines, 171 while the civil defendant is not and is thereby vulnerable to 
huge, disproportionate, and even multiple punitive awards. 172 With-
out excessive fines clause protection, an odd question results: Will de-
fendants seek criminal prosecutions to obtain the Constitution's 
safeguard against excessive fines and to avoid an unrestrained punitive 
damage award in the civil courts?113 
- Andrew M. Kenefick 
169. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 96. 
170. Cf. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 686 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). 
171. See, e.g., United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1987). 
172. Compare Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 215-16 (Colo. 1984) (addressing the 
threat of multiple awards), with Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 97 III. 2d 195, 212, 454 
N.E.2d 210, 219 (1983) ("[A]n additional award would not serve to punish or deter the defen-
dant who had already been punished in the first action."). 
173. Justice White might rephrase his dissenting comment in Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 684, to 
read: 
[I]f it is constitutionally impermissible [to fine] someone [excessively) for the commission of 
murder, it must be unconstitutional to [assess excessive punitive damages] for being late to 
class. 
